Donald Trump faces the reality of world trade
中国能否取代美国的贸易角色？
广州贸易翻译公司：沃尔夫：中国在世界贸易中取代美国的程度是有限的。整个亚洲都难以独自维持世界贸易的活力，中国就更不行了。
Might China rescue the globalisation of trade from its rejection by the US, under President Donald Trump? Could the threat of Chinese leadership, or pressure from US business, persuade Mr Trump to take another look at trade deals, even President Barack Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership?
中国有没有可能挽救被唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)总统的美国所抛弃的贸易全球化？中国领导人发出的威胁，或者美国企业施加的压力，有没有可能劝服特朗普重新考虑贸易协定，甚至包括巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)总统的《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》(TPP)？广州贸易翻译公司。
The answer to the first question is: only up to a point. China could not replace an engaged and outward-looking US, even if it wanted to — but it could help. As to Mr Trump’s intentions, are they fixed or negotiable?
第一个问题的答案是：仅在一定程度上可以。中国不能取代一个参与性的、外向型的美国——即便它想这么做也不行，但它可以有所帮助。至于特朗普的意图，它们是固定不变的还是可以协商的？
President Xi Jinping this weekend promised a brave new Beijing-led order marked by openness to trade and investment. Mr Obama’s TPP was designed to exclude China. Now Mr Trump has announced the US will pull out of the deal when he takes office. This leaves the way open for China to push ahead with its alternative: the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Seven of the 12 putative members of TPP are potential members of RCEP. Mr Xi also offers Latin American countries access to China’s “One Belt One Road” initiative.
最近，中国国家主席习近平承诺建立一个对贸易和投资开放的、由北京主导的全新秩序。奥巴马的TPP从根本上把中国排除在外。现在特朗普已宣布，他上任后美国将退出TPP。这为中国提供了推进替代方案《区域全面经济伙伴关系协定》(RCEP)的机会。在12个推定TPP成员国中，有7个是潜在的RCEP成员国。习近平还向拉美国家提供了加入中国“一带一路”(One Belt One Road)倡议的机会。
Yet there are limits to how far China might replace the US, let alone the west, in world trade. If we look at shares of global gross domestic product at market prices, a crude measure of actual purchasing power, China’s share jumped from 4 per cent in 2000 to 15 per cent in 2016. The share of Asia (including Japan) is 31 per cent. Meanwhile, the US and the EU together account for 47 per cent of global GDP. Similarly, despite growing rapidly, China’s share in global imports was only 12 per cent in 2015, while that of Asia was 36 per cent. The US and EU (excluding intra-EU trade) still accounted for 31 per cent of world imports.
然而，中国在世界贸易中取代美国（且不提整个西方）的程度是有限的。如果我们从市场价格（这是一种粗略衡量实际购买力的标准）角度考察全球国内生产总值(GDP)占比，中国的占比从2000年的4%跃升至2016年的15%。亚洲（包括日本）的占比为31%。同时，美国和欧盟(EU)的占比之和为47%。同样，尽管增长迅速，但2015年中国在全球进口中的占比仅为12%，而亚洲的占比为36%。美国和欧盟（不包括欧盟内部贸易）的占比之和仍达31%。广州贸易翻译公司。
Moreover, this understates the role of high-income economies in world trade, in two significant respects. First, much of the world’s final demand still comes from these economies: at market prices, Chinese consumption was roughly a third of that of the US and EU combined in 2015. Second and far more important, the knowledge driving much of contemporary trade comes from companies of high-income economies. Chinese companies have still no comparable depth of know-how to offer.
此外，从两个重要方面看，这低估了高收入经济体在世界贸易中的作用。首先，世界最终需求的很大部分仍来自这些经济体：以市场价格计，2015年中国消费大约是美国和欧盟总消费的三分之一。其次，更重要的是，驱动当代大部分贸易的专门知识来自于高收入经济体的公司。中国企业仍不能提供可比深度的专门知识。
In The Great Convergence, Richard Baldwin of the Graduate School in Geneva sheds a bright light on the nature of trade in today’s era — the “second globalisation” since the industrial revolution.
在《大融合》(The Great Convergence)一书中，日内瓦国际研究所(Graduate Institute in Geneva)的理查德•鲍德温(Richard Baldwin)透彻剖析了当今贸易的性质——自工业革命以来的“第二次全球化”。
His core point is that trade is always limited by the costs of distance, the relevant costs being those of transportation, communication and face-to-face contact. In the first globalisation, in the late 19th century, the rapid growth of world trade was driven by the fall in the costs of transport of goods. This made it possible to create a global exchange of manufactures against the natural resources and agricultural products from mainly the Americas and Australasia.
他的核心观点是，贸易总是受到距离相关成本的制约，这些成本包括运输、通信和面对面接触的成本。在19世纪末的第一次全球化期间，世界贸易的快速增长是由货物运输成本的下降推动的。它使创建一个全球交换体系成为可能：制成品与主要来自美洲和澳大利亚的自然资源和农产品之间的交换。广州贸易翻译公司。
In that era, however, it was impossible to unbundle the manufacturing process. To compete in industry, a country had to master all the necessary skills. As a result manufacturing, and with it the gains from economies of scale and learning-by-doing, were concentrated in high-income economies.
然而，在那个时代，把制造过程拆分开是不可能的。若要在工业领域展开竞争，一国必须掌握所有必要的技能。结果，制造业及其带来的规模经济和边做边学的成果集中到了高收入经济体。
Furthermore, modestly skilled workers in these countries shared much of these gains — achieving, as a result, unprecedented incomes and political influence. This happened because they had privileged access to the fruits of the knowledge developed within their economies.
这还不算，这些国家的具有中等技能水平的劳动者分享了很大一部分成果——进而获得了前所未有的收入和政治影响力。这是因为他们可以优先获得所在经济体开发出来的知识成果。
Until about a quarter of a century ago, the only way to break into this charmed circle was to develop competitive industries of one’s own. This was difficult: few countries managed it. But, in the second globalisation, costs of communication fell so far that it became possible to unbundle (or fragment) the production process, with the production of components and final assembly scattered across the world, under the control of manufacturers or buyers with the relevant knowledge. As Mr Baldwin puts it, workers in South Carolina “are not competing with Mexican labour, Mexican capital and Mexican technology as they did in the 1970s. They are competing with a nearly unbeatable combination of US know-how and Mexican wages.”
直到大约四分之一世纪前，打入这个迷人圈子的唯一方法是发展自己的竞争性产业。这是困难的：很少有国家能做到。但是，在第二次全球化中，通信成本下降幅度如此大，以至于生产过程有可能被拆分（或者说碎片化）；在拥有相关知识的制造商或买家的控制下，组件生产和最终组装被分散到世界各地。正如鲍德温所说，南卡罗来纳州的工人“不像1970年代那样与墨西哥劳动力、墨西哥资本和墨西哥技术竞争。他们是在与一种近乎无敌的组合（美国技术加上墨西哥工资）展开竞争。” 广州贸易翻译公司。
National capitalism became global. This also applied to some service activities. Most developing economies failed to take advantage of these opportunities. But some did — notably China.
国家资本主义成为全球现象。这也适用于一些服务活动。多数发展中经济体未能利用这些机会。但有些经济体——特别是中国——做到了。
Trade of manufactures for raw materials continues too, notably between China and its suppliers. But it is the new dynamic of trade that drove the protectionism that brought Mr Trump to power. The political struggle is now over who benefits from the know-how developed by the companies of high-income countries. That struggle raises an important normative question: who ought to win? It also raises a positive one: who will win? Will Mr Trump favour US workers over the owners and managers of US companies?
以制成品换取原材料的贸易也在继续，尤其是在中国与其供应国之间。但是，正是这种新的贸易格局助燃了保护主义，进而把特朗普推上权力宝座。如今，政治斗争的焦点是：谁获益于高收入国家的企业开发出的专门知识？这场斗争引出了一个重要的规范性问题：谁应该赢？它也引出了一个肯定问句：谁会赢？特朗普是否将优先照顾美国工人，而不是美国企业的股东和管理人员？
Or will he merely pretend he does so, offering token gestures — rejecting TPP, renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement or threatening China with tariffs while leaving most world trade much as it is? Might he not conclude, in fact, that giving China a chance to organise world trade is against US interests? Might he not fear that, by limiting the US role in the global unbundling of production, his country’s companies would be at a disadvantage and might move even more of their activities to more welcoming regions?
抑或他只会用象征性的姿态假装这样做——拒绝TPP，重新谈判北美自由贸易协定(NAFTA)或威胁对中国开征关税——而让大部分世界贸易保持现有状态？难道他不会得出结论认为，给中国一个组织世界贸易的机会，事实上对美国是不利的？难道他不担心，限制美国在全球生产分拆中的角色，将使美国企业处于劣势，进而促使它们把更多业务迁至更欢迎它们的地区？
It is not possible for Asia as a whole, let alone China, to maintain the dynamism of world trade on its own. The west matters far too much, not least for China.
整个亚洲都不可能独自维持世界贸易的活力，中国的一己之力就更不行了。西方的重要性太大了，对中国来说尤其如此。
Fortunately, the forces in favour of global trade remain quite strong. Even Mr Trump might lack the ability or the will to thwart them altogether.
幸运的是，支持全球贸易的力量仍相当强大。就连特朗普也可能缺乏能量或意志来彻底挫败它们。
