中国动员国企投入经济刺激
广州经济翻译公司：5月国企占固定资产投资35.4%，达到2011年以来高位。中国政府正在推动国企加大支出，力图避免经济硬着陆。
China's slowing investment, which hit a 16-year low in May, has forced Beijing to press the country’s lumbering state groups into service, demanding that they ramp up spending in a bid to avert an economic hard landing.
中国不断放缓的投资（5月跌至16年最低位）迫使北京方面动员国内笨拙的国有集团，要求它们加大支出，力图避免经济硬着陆。广州经济翻译公司。
The move is a setback for Beijing’s efforts to make the country’s 160,000 state-owned enterprises more like their private sector peers. SOEs, which account for about a fifth of economic output, trail far behind private companies in terms of profitability. Despite their inefficiency, SOEs’ share of overall fixed-asset investment reached 35.4 per cent in May, the highest since 2011, official data showed last week.
此举对于北京方面推动全国16万家国企更像私营部门同行的努力是一个挫折。占中国经济产出约五分之一的国有企业，在盈利能力方面远远落后于民营企业。尽管国企效率低下，但上周发布的官方数据显示，5月国企在固定资产投资总额中的占比达到35.4%，这是自2011年以来的最高位。广州经济翻译公司。
“SOEs are useful at the moment but it can’t go on like this forever,” said Larry Hu, head of China economics at Macquarie Securities in Hong Kong. “As returns get lower and lower, SOEs lose usefulness as tools of macroeconomic policy and become a burden on the state. You have to pour in more and more credit to get the same impact.”
“国企眼下有用，但不能永远这样下去，”麦格理证券(Macquarie Securities)常驻香港的中国经济研究主管胡伟俊(Larry Hu)表示，“随着回报越来越低，国有企业作为宏观经济政策工具逐渐失去效用，反而变成国家的负担。你不得不投入越来越多的信贷，才能得到同样的效果。”广州经济翻译公司。
As recently as May 2015, investment by private companies was still growing faster than at state groups. But the trends diverged in the second half of last year. With storm clouds gathering over the economy, private companies drew in their horns. In response, the government unleashed a wave of fiscal spending and loose credit to fund SOE investment in roads, railways, sewers and slum redevelopment.
就在2015年5月，民营企业的投资增速仍快于国有集团。但两者的走势在去年下半年出现分化。随着风暴云笼罩中国经济，民营企业开始减少投资。作为回应，政府释放了一波财政支出和宽松信贷，为国有企业投资于道路、铁路、下水道和棚户区改造提供资金。
The risk for SOEs is that this strategy adds to their worryingly high debt load while saddling them with more low-performing assets. Industrial SOEs generated a return on assets of 2.9 per cent in 2015 compared with 10.3 per cent for private industrial enterprises.
对国有企业而言，风险在于这一战略加大了它们本已令人担忧的高债务负担，同时让它们背上更多表现不佳的资产。国有工业企业2015年的资产回报率仅为2.9%，远低于民营工业企业的10.3%。
“The role that SOEs have now been assigned . . . points to a future of higher government debt (as the implicit liabilities of SOEs are taken on by the government) and lower interest rates (to allow SOEs to continue their low-return investments),” Andrew Batson, China research director at Gavekal Dragonomics, wrote on Monday.
“国有企业现在被指派的角色……指向这样一种未来：较高的政府债务（随着国企的隐性负债被政府承担）和较低的利率（让国企继续低回报的投资），”北京龙洲经讯(Gavekal Dragonomics)中国研究总监白安儒(Andrew Batson)周一写道。
Initial SOE reform proposals focused on improving corporate governance to make management more profit-orientated and less subject to political interference, following the so-called “Temasek model” named after
最初的国企改革提议聚焦于改善公司治理，使管理层在更大程度上以利润为导向，少受政治干预，借鉴以新加坡主权财富基金命名的所谓“淡马锡模式”(Temasek model)。但如果成功的话，国有集团作为经济刺激工具的有效性将会降低。
That helps explain why the focus of SOE reform has recently shifted towards megamergers of state groups. Such mergers are partly intended to boost competitiveness through economies of scale. But the government is also forcing stronger groups to absorb weaker rivals as an alternative to bankruptcies, lay-offs and factory closures. That leaves underlying issues of overcapacity and weak profitability unaddressed.
这有助于解释国企改革的重点近期为什么转向国有集团的大规模合并。这类合并在一定程度上是为了实现规模效益，从而增强竞争力。但是，政府也在迫使比较强大的集团吸收较弱的对手，以避免后者破产、裁员和关闭工厂。这使产能过剩和盈利能力弱的根本问题没有得到应对。广州经济翻译公司。
The government intention to maintain SOEs as instruments of policy also underlies the recent emphasis on strengthening Communist party control of state groups by increasing the role of internal party committees.
政府维持国企作为政策工具的意图，也体现于近期对于加强国有集团内部党委（党组）的作用，强化党对国企控制的注重。
Despite drawbacks, use of SOEs for infrastructure investment may be the best option available to prevent a sharp slowdown that
尽管有缺点，但利用国企进行基础设施投资，就防止急剧放缓而言可能是可用的最佳选择；中国领导层担心，经济急剧放缓可能引发社会和金融不稳定。
The current approach differs from the stimulus launched in 2008 in response to the global financial crisis, which focused on using credit expansion to fund construction of new factories. That included an investment boom by private companies, which account for 88 per cent of all manufacturing investment, according to China International Capital Corp. By contrast, 72 per cent of infrastructure investment comes from SOEs.
目前的方法不同于2008年针对全球金融危机出台的刺激方案，那时的侧重点是利用信贷扩张为建设新工厂提供资金。它包括由民营企业发起的投资热潮；中金公司(CICC)数据显示，民企占制造业全部投资的88%。与此形成对比的是，72%的基础设施投资来自国有企业。
“Strong state-led infrastructure investment does not aggravate overcapacity,” Harrison Hu, chief China economist at Royal Bank of Scotland in Singapore, wrote last week. “By creating final demand, it helps digest the inventory of industrial goods, as well as buffering overall investment and GDP growth. “
“政府主导的强劲的基础设施投资不会加重产能过剩，”苏格兰皇家银行(RBS)驻新加坡的首席中国经济学家胡志鹏(Harrison Hu)上周写道，“通过创造最终需求，它有助于消化工业品库存，同时稳住总投资和国内生产总值(GDP)增长。”
Mr Hu believes that sliding private and manufacturing investment suggests the country has been on the right track of cutting excess capacity. “Instead of being a reason to be more pessimistic on
胡志鹏认为，民企和制造业投资下滑，似乎表明中国步入了削减过剩产能的正确轨道上。“这不应该是一个对中国更加悲观的理由，”他写道，“它恰恰是在重组和再平衡过程中应该会出现的局面。”
Many analysts now believe the best hope for dealing with inefficient SOEs is not to change them from the inside but to shrink their relative share of the economy. That means opening up protected industries to competition from private business and reducing the many advantages SOEs enjoy, especially access to finance.
许多分析师现在认为，处理效率低下的国有企业胜算最大的办法，并不是从内部改变它们，而是缩小它们在经济体中的相对份量。这意味着开放受保护的行业，允许民营企业竞争，并减少国企目前享受的众多优势，尤其是在融资渠道方面。
“I don’t think SOEs can be ‘reformed’. They can only be downsized,” said Mr Hu. “Within
“我不认为国企能够‘被改革’。它们只能被缩小，”胡志鹏表示，“在中国的国家资本主义体制内，你只能指望少一些‘国家'，多一些‘资本主义’。”
Additional reporting by Ma Nan
Ma Nan补充报道
