Whatever happened to the
“中国风险”还会卷土重来吗？
广州翻译公司：戴维斯：国际市场曾为中国硬着陆和人民币贬值深感忧虑，但担忧最终都未成真。与中国经济相关的风险真的会凭空消失吗？
In January, the markets panicked about a hard landing in
今年1月，市场担忧中国经济硬着陆，同时担心人民币突然贬值，使通缩压力蔓延到全球所有其他地方。结果这些都没有发生，全球市场急剧上涨。为何与中国相关的风险突然消失，它们还会卷土重来吗？广州翻译公司。
One reason why the risks abated had little to do with
风险减弱的一个原因与中国本身没有多大关系，而是与美联储(Fed)密切相关。在今年2月全球市场暴跌期间，以比尔•达德利(Bill Dudley)为首的美国联邦公开市场委员会(FOMC)主要成员意识到，美元持续升值导致美国金融环境过紧，于是他们突然采取了更为鸽派的立场。广州翻译公司。
Many people think that an international “meeting of minds” occurred at the Shanghai G20 conference in late February. As a result, the Federal Reserve delayed its rate increases, the Bank of Japan and the ECB desisted from “devaluationist” monetary policies, and
许多人认为，今年2月底在上海召开的20国集团(G20)会议达成了国际“一致意见”。因此，美联储延迟加息，日本央行(BoJ)和欧洲央行(ECB)放弃“货币贬值主义”货币政策，中国表示不会让人民币突然贬值。这一切使全球金融环境放松，并在美元疲弱期间安抚了外汇市场。
This improvement in global financial relations may not last forever. It is true that the FOMC is beginning to recognise the importance of foreign economic conditions for its own domestic policies (see David Beckworth).
这种全球金融关系的改善可能不会持久。的确，FOMC开始认识到外国经济状况对国内政策的重要性（见大卫•贝克沃思(David Beckworth)文章）。
However, as Lawrence Summers pointed out last week, they have repeatedly returned to the “normalisation” of interest rates whenever they are given the slightest excuse for doing so. The bond and equity markets of
然而，正如劳伦斯•萨默斯(Lawrence Summers)上周指出的那样，每当有最轻微的借口，他们都反复回到利率“正常化”的道路上。日本和德国的债市和股市继续显示出通缩压力加剧的所有迹象，这可能迫使央行在不太遥远的未来出手干预，即便不考虑令人头疼的英国退欧风险。
What about events inside
中国国内情况如何？这里有一些好消息，还有一些不那么好的消息。广州翻译公司。
On the good news side, the balance of policy has generally shifted in a favourable direction in the course of 2016. Some months ago, I suggested that the right policy mix for
先说好消息，2016年政策平衡大体转向有利方向。数月前，我建议中国正确的政策组合应包括6个关键要素：加快关闭制造业过剩产能；紧急清理银行业体系；放松货币政策；加大财政政策支持力度；让人民币有序贬值；以及继续实施以市场为导向的结构性改革。
The basic idea was that the rebalancing of the economy towards the service sectors had barely started, but was increasingly necessary. When it gathered pace, it would probably involve a negative demand shock to the economy which would need to be countered by easier fiscal and monetary policy settings.
基本观点是，转向服务业的经济再平衡几乎还没开始，但越来越有必要。当再平衡提速时，可能对经济产生负面需求冲击，届时中国将有必要通过放松财政和货币政策来应对。
It would also involve a shock to the financial sector, since the disguised bad debts in the corporate sector, especially the SOE’s, would be exposed. In order to retain confidence in the economy and the currency, the banking sector would need to be recapitalised by shifting some of their bad debts more formally into government debt. It would be easier to restore confidence, and reduce capital flight, if the exchange rate were no longer seen by the markets to be overvalued.
它还将对金融领域产生冲击，因为企业部门（尤其是国有企业）中掩盖的坏账将被曝光。为了维持对经济和人民币的信心，中国有必要对银行业部门进行资产重组，将其部分坏账更为正式地转化为政府债务。如果市场不再认为人民币币值高估，恢复信心和减少资本外流就会更容易。
There has been progress in each of these areas in recent months. On monetary policy, while interest rates have not been cut, there was a significant increase in monetary growth early in the new year, which is normally a reliable signal of monetary stimulus in
最近几个月来，中国在所有这些领域都取得了进展。在货币政策领域，尽管没有降息，但今年年初货币供应大幅增长，这通常是中国货币刺激的可靠迹象。摩根大通(JP Morgan)的法政调查显示，中国财政政策立场依然模糊，但已经放松，今年将扩张GDP的0.5%左右。
The pace of factory closures in the manufacturing sector has clearly been increased, following the emphasis placed on rebalancing at the National People’s Congress this year. For the first time, there has been a shift in real resources away from manufacturing and investment, towards new sectors. Previously, there had been deflation in manufactured goods prices, but no shift in employment or real factory output.
在今年全国人大会议重点提出经济再平衡之后，制造业工厂关闭步伐显著加快。实体资源首次从制造业和投资转向新的领域。而之前，工业品出厂价格下降，但就业或实际工厂产出没有任何变化。
As a result of all of these measures, the economy has once again stepped back from the brink of a hard landing, and is now growing, on the official figures, above the 6.5 per cent target for 2016.
由于上述所有举措，中国经济再次退离硬着陆边缘，官方数据显示，现在经济增速超过了2016年6.5%的增长目标。
On the less good news side of the equation, however, there are three key concerns.
然而，就不那么好的消息来说，中国有3点值得担忧。
First, the benign policy mix that has emerged in recent months does not seem to have been the result of a joined-up series of agreements between the various actors in the policy-making process within the Chinese government. In fact, a remarkable intervention by a so-called “authoritative person” in the People’s Daily in early May has been widely taken to have been a direct warning about the dangers of the recent economic stance from sources close to the office of President Xi Jinping himself.
首先，最近几个月出现的有利政策组合似乎不是中国政府内部决策过程中各决策人士协商一致的结果。实际上，今年5月上旬，所谓“权威人士”在《人民日报》(People’s Daily)上发出了明显干预，外界普遍认为，这是接近中国国家主席习近平办公室的人士对最近经济立场的风险提出的直接警告。
This intervention directly criticised virtually all aspects of the recent easing in macro demand policy, arguing that it would delay the inevitable rebalancing of the economy and inject further leverage into an over-leveraged economy. Opinions differ about whether this was intended to be a direct personal attack on the policies of Premier Li Keqiang but it clearly raises serious doubts about how the policy mix might develop in future.
该权威人士直接抨击了最近宏观需求宽松政策的几乎所有方面，称其将延迟经济的必然再平衡，并给过度杠杆化的经济注入更多杠杆。这是否是针对中国总理李克强的政策的直接个人攻击，人们意见不一，但这显然让人严重怀疑未来这种政策组合如何发展。
Second, the IMF has recently warned very strongly that the problem of excessive corporate debt needs to be tackled much more decisively than has happened so far. David Lipton spelled this out in a very clear speech last week, calling for debt work-outs, corporate restructuring and improved governance, and recapitalisation of the banking system on an urgent timescale.
其次，国际货币基金组织(IMF)最近强烈警告称，中国政府有必要以比以往更坚决的态度解决企业过度负债问题。IMF第一副总裁戴维•利普顿(David Lipton)上周在一场演讲中非常清晰地阐述了这个问题，并呼吁紧急制定债务解决方案、进行企业重组并提高治理水平、对银行业体系进行资本重组。广州翻译公司。
He said that the corporate debt write-downs might amount to “at least” 7 per cent of GDP, which is a surprisingly low estimate. More likely, the write-downs will prove to be much larger, and will take many years to complete. They are clearly proving very difficult from a political and practical point of view, as they usually do in emerging markets at this stage of development. And dangerous stress in the corporate debt market is becoming far more visible.
他说，企业债务减记可能“至少”相当于GDP的7%——这是一个令人意外的保守估计。更可能的情况是，减记规模将会大得多，需要许多年才会完成。从政治和现实的角度来看，减记显然将会非常困难，新兴市场在这一发展阶段通常都是如此。企业债券市场的危险态势正变得越来越明显。
Third, there is the continuing mystery over the PBOC’s exchange rate strategy. In January, the central bank appeared to “clarify” that it would be seeking to stabilise the renminbi against a basket of currencies, while allowing greater flexibility than before against the dollar. Since then, however, the Chinese currency has embarked on a continuous path of depreciation versus the basket, at a rate of around 12 per cent per annum. This has happened both when the dollar has been rising and when it has been falling.
第三，中国人民银行(PBOC)的汇率战略依然保持神秘。今年1月，中国央行似乎“澄清”称，将寻求保持人民币兑一篮子货币汇率的稳定，同时允许人民币兑美元汇率比以前更加灵活。然而，自那以来，人民币兑一篮子货币汇率开启了持续贬值，年化贬值率达到大约12%。无论是美元升值还是美元贬值期间，人民币兑一篮子货币均在贬值。
While the RMB decline is in the right direction, the communication of the policy has once again been highly confusing, and there are signs that capital outflows from
尽管人民币贬值这一方向没错，但政策沟通再次令人深感困惑，有迹象表明，中国可能再次出现了资本外流，因为人们日益怀疑人民币暗中贬值。
In the past few years,
在过去几年里，中国风险起起落落，始终没有消失。这种缓慢酝酿的“风险”仍在发酵，无论哪个方向都没有很快解决的明显迹象。
