US against the world? Trump’s America and the new global order
特朗普的美国与新全球秩序
广州经济翻译公司：福山：特朗普担任美国总统将标志着一个时代的终结，在那个时代，美国对世界各地的人们而言就是民主的象征。
Donald Trump’s stunning electoral defeat of Hillary Clinton marks a watershed not just for American politics, but for the entire world order. We appear to be entering a new age of populist nationalism, in which the dominant liberal order that has been constructed since the 1950s has come under attack from angry and energised democratic majorities. The risk of sliding into a world of competitive and equally angry nationalisms is huge, and if this happens it would mark as momentous a juncture as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.
唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)在选举中意外击败希拉里•克林顿(Hillary Clinton)，不仅对美国政治而言标志着一个分水岭，对整个世界秩序也是如此。我们似乎正进入一个新的民粹民族主义时代。在这个时代，自上世纪50年代构建起的主导的自由秩序，受到了情绪激愤的民主多数的攻击。世界陷入同样愤怒的各种民族主义相互竞争的风险巨大。如果这种情况发生，它将标志着一个与1989年柏林墙倒塌同样重大的关头。广州经济翻译公司。
The manner of Trump’s victory lays bare the social basis of the movement he has mobilised. A look at the voting map shows Clinton’s support concentrated geographically in cities along the coasts, with swaths of rural and small-town America voting solidly for Trump. The most surprising shifts were his flipping of Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin, three northern industrial states that were so solidly Democratic in recent elections that Clinton didn’t even bother to campaign in the latter one. He won by being able to win over unionised workers who had been hit by deindustrialisation, promising to “make America great again” by restoring their lost manufacturing jobs.
特朗普获胜的方式暴露了他动员起的这场运动的社会基础。看一看投票地图，我们可以发现，希拉里的支持者集中于沿海城市，而农村和小城镇地区坚定地投票支持特朗普。最令人意想不到的是他在宾夕法尼亚、密歇根和威斯康星的翻盘，这三个北部工业州在最近几次选举中曾是如此固若金汤的民主党州，以至于希拉里甚至没有去威斯康星造势。特朗普获胜是因为他得以争取到那些受到去工业化冲击的工会工人的支持，他承诺通过恢复他们失去的制造业工作岗位，“让美国再次变得伟大”。
We have seen this story before. This is the story of Brexit, where the pro-Leave vote was similarly concentrated in rural areas and small towns and cities outside London. It is also true in France, where working-class voters whose parents and grandparents used to vote for the Communist or Socialist parties are voting for Marine Le Pen’s National Front.
这一幕似曾相识。英国退欧就是这种情况——支持退欧的投票同样集中于农村地区、小城镇以及伦敦以外的其他城市。在法国也是如此，父辈和祖父辈曾投票给共产党或社会党的工人阶级选民，眼下正投票支持马琳•勒庞(Marine Le Pen)的国民阵线(National Front)。广州经济翻译公司。
But populist nationalism is a far broader phenomenon than that. Vladimir Putin remains unpopular among more educated voters in big cities such as St Petersburg and Moscow, but has a huge support base in the rest of the country. The same is true of Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has an enthusiastic support base among the country’s conservative lower middle class, or Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orban, who is popular everywhere but in Budapest.
但民粹民族主义是一个远比这更广泛的现象。弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)在圣彼得堡、莫斯科等俄罗斯大城市受教育程度较高的选民中仍旧不受欢迎，但在该国其他地区却拥有众多支持者。对土耳其总统雷杰普•塔伊普•埃尔多安(Recep Tayyip Erdogan)或者匈牙利总理欧尔班•维克托(Viktor Orban)来说也是如此，前者在土耳其保守的中产阶级下层中受到狂热的支持，而后者在除了布达佩斯的整个匈牙利都受到欢迎。
Social class, defined today by one’s level of education, appears to have become the single most important social fracture in countless industrialised and emerging-market countries. This, in turn, is driven directly by globalisation and the march of technology, which has been facilitated in turn by the liberal world order created largely by the US since 1945.
如今，由个人受教育程度界定的社会阶层，似乎已经成为很多工业化和新兴市场国家中最重要的社会分割线。这种现象受到全球化和技术进步的直接推动，而促进全球化和技术进步的正是自1945年以来主要由美国创建的自由世界秩序。
When we talk about a liberal world order, we are speaking about the rules-based system of international trade and investment that has fuelled global growth in recent years. This is the system that allows iPhones to be assembled in China and shipped to customers in the US or Europe in the week before Christmas. It has also facilitated the movement of millions of people from poorer countries to richer ones, where they can find greater opportunities for themselves and their children. This system has worked as advertised: between 1970 and the US financial crisis of 2008, global output of goods and services quadrupled, bringing hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, not just in China and India but in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa.
在我们谈论自由世界秩序时，我们说的是近年来推动全球增长的、基于规则的国际贸易和投资体系。正是这一体系使得苹果手机能够在中国组装、并在圣诞节前一周运至美国或欧洲的消费者手中。这一体系还方便了数以百万计的人口从较贫困国家迁移至较富裕国家——在那里他们可以为自己和子女找到更好的发展机会。这一体系如宣传的那样奏效：从1970年到2008年美国金融危机，全球商品和服务产出翻了两番，让数亿人口摆脱了贫困——不仅包括生活在中国和印度的人，还包括生活在拉丁美洲和撒哈拉以南非洲地区的人。广州经济翻译公司。
But as everyone is painfully aware now, the benefits of this system did not filter down to the whole population. The working classes in the developed world saw their jobs disappear as companies outsourced and squeezed efficiencies in response to a ruthlessly competitive global market.
但正如现在大家都已痛苦地意识到的，该体系所带来的好处并没有层层惠及所有人群。随着企业为应对竞争残酷的全球市场而进行外包并尽可能提高效率，发达国家工人阶级失去了工作。
This long-term story was hugely exacerbated by the US subprime crisis of 2008, and the euro crisis that hit Europe a couple of years later. In both cases, systems designed by elites — liberalised financial markets in the US case, and European policies such as the euro and the Schengen system of internal migration — collapsed dramatically in the face of external shocks. The costs of these failures were again much more heavily borne by ordinary workers than by the elites themselves. Ever since, the real question should not have been why populism has emerged in 2016, but why it took so long to become manifest.
这一长期问题因2008年美国次贷危机以及几年后欧洲遭遇的欧元危机而大大加剧。在这两场危机中，精英们设计的体系——美国的自由金融市场以及欧洲的欧元和管理内部人口流动的申根(Schengen)体系等政策——在面对外部冲击时都迅速崩溃。这些失败的代价又一次更多地由普通工人、而非精英自身承担。从此以后，真正的问题不应再是为什么民粹主义在2016年出现，而是为什么它过了这么久才显现出来。广州经济翻译公司。
In the US, there was a political failure insofar as the system did not adequately represent the traditional working class. The Republican party was dominated by corporate America and its allies who had profited handsomely from globalisation, while the Democratic party had become the party of identity politics: a coalition of women, African-Americans, Hispanics, environmentalists, and the LGBT community, that lost its focus on economic issues.
在美国，政治上出现了这样一个错误：政治体制未充分代表传统工人阶级。从全球化中获利颇丰的美国企业界及其盟友主导了共和党；而民主党已变成一个玩弄身份政治的政党：一个由女性、非洲裔美国人、西裔美国人、环保主义者以及LGBT（女同性恋者、男同性恋者、双性恋者与跨性别者）等群体组成的联盟，不再关注经济问题。
The failure of the American left to represent the working class is mirrored in similar failures across Europe. European social democracy had made its peace with globalisation a couple of decades ago, in the form of Blairite centrism or the kind of neoliberal reformism engineered by Gerhard Schröder’s Social Democrats in the 2000s.
美国左翼未能代表工人阶级，欧洲各地的左翼也犯下同样的错误。二十年前，欧洲的社会民主主义就已经同全球化和解了，和解的表现就是布莱尔中间路线，以及德国前总理格哈德•施罗德(Gerhard Schröder)的社会民主党在本世纪头十年设计的新自由主义改革。广州经济翻译公司。
But the broader failure of the left was the same one made in the lead-up to 1914 and the Great war, when, in the apt phrase of the British-Czech philosopher, Ernest Gellner, a letter sent to a mailbox marked “class” was mistakenly delivered to one marked “nation.” Nation almost always trumps class because it is able to tap into a powerful source of identity, the desire to connect with an organic cultural community. This longing for identity is now emerging in the form of the American alt-right, a formerly ostracised collection of groups espousing white nationalism in one form or another. But even short of these extremists, many ordinary American citizens began to wonder why their communities were filling up with immigrants, and who had authorised a system of politically correct language by which one could not even complain about the problem. This is why Donald Trump received a huge number of votes from better-educated and more well-off voters as well, who were not victims of globalisation but still felt their country was being taken from them. Needless to say, this dynamic underlay the Brexit vote as well.
但左翼的更大错误跟一战前的那个是同一个，当时的情况——借用捷克裔英国哲学家埃内斯特•格尔纳(Ernest Gellner)形象的描述——是一封本应投进标为“阶级”(class)的邮箱的信件，被错误地投进了标为“民族”(nation)的邮箱。民族几乎总是压倒阶级，因为它能利用一种强烈的身份认同感，那种与一个有机的文化共同体建立联系的渴望。这种对身份认同的渴望正以美国新右翼(alt-right)的形式显现出来，新右翼包括各种以前受到排斥的形形色色的白人至上主义团体。但即使没有这些极端主义者，很多普通美国公民也开始奇怪为什么他们的社区中出现越来越多的移民，又是谁授权建立了一套讲究语言的政治正确性的体制，在这个体制中人们甚至不能抱怨这一问题。这就是为什么特朗普从受教育程度更高、更富裕的选民那里也得到了不少选票，这些人不是全球化的受害者，但仍感到有人正从他们手中夺走他们的国家。不用说，英国投票退欧本质上也是因为同样的原因。
So what will be the concrete consequences of the Trump victory for the international system? Contrary to his critics, Trump does have a consistent and thought-through position: he is a nationalist on economic policy, and in relation to the global political system. He has clearly stated that he will seek to renegotiate existing trade agreements such as Nafta and presumably the WTO, and if he doesn’t get what he wants, he is willing to contemplate exiting from them. And he has expressed admiration for “strong” leaders such as Russia’s Putin who nonetheless get results through decisive action. He is correspondingly much less enamoured of traditional US allies such as those in Nato, or Japan and South Korea, whom he has accused of freeriding on American power. This suggests that support for them will also be conditional on a renegotiation of the cost-sharing arrangements now in place.
那么，特朗普获胜对国际体系将带来哪些实际影响？与他的批评者相反，特朗普确实拥有始终如一、经过深思熟虑的立场：他在经济政策和全球政治体系方面是一个民族主义者。他明确表示，将寻求就现有贸易协议重新进行谈判，如北美自由贸易协定(NAFTA)，可能还有世贸组织(WTO)。如果他得不到自己想要的，他愿意考虑让美国退出。他对普京等通过果断行动一样办成了事情的“强人”领袖表示了赞赏。相比之下，他对北约成员国或日本、韩国等美国的传统盟国要冷淡得多，并指责这些国家搭美国力量的便车。这意味着，对这些盟友的支持将依据对现有费用分担安排的重新谈判而定。广州经济翻译公司。
The dangers of these positions for both the global economy and for the global security system are impossible to overstate. The world today is brimming with economic nationalism. Traditionally, an open trade and investment regime has depended on the hegemonic power of the US to remain afloat. If the US begins acting unilaterally to change the terms of the contract, there are many powerful players around the world who would be happy to retaliate, and set off a downward economic spiral reminiscent of the 1930s.
这些立场对全球经济和全球安全体系的威胁，怎样往严重了说都不为过。当今世界充满经济民族主义。一直以来，一个开放的贸易和投资体系的正常运转，依靠的都是美国的霸权。如果美国开始单方面采取行动修改这一契约的条款，全世界范围内有很多强大的参与者都将乐于展开报复，并引发一场上世纪30年代那样的经济螺旋式下行。
The danger to the international security system is as great. Russia and China have emerged in the past decades as leading authoritarian great powers, both of whom have territorial ambitions. Trump’s position on Russia is particularly troubling: he has never uttered a critical word about Putin, and has suggested that his takeover of Crimea was perhaps justified. Given his general ignorance about most aspects of foreign policy, his consistent specificity with regard to Russia suggests that Putin has some hidden leverage over him, perhaps in the form of debts to Russian sources that keep his business empire afloat. The first victim of any Trumpist attempt to “get along better” with Russia will be Ukraine and Georgia, two countries that have relied on US support to retain their independence as struggling democracies.
这些立场对国际安全体系的威胁同样巨大。过去几十年间，俄罗斯、中国已崛起为重要的威权主义大国，且两国都有领土野心。特朗普对俄罗斯的立场尤其令人担忧：他从未对普京有过半句批评，还暗示后者吞并克里米亚或许是合理的。考虑到特朗普对外交政策大多数方面整体的无知，他对俄罗斯的始终如一的特殊态度暗示着，普京对特朗普拥有某种隐形的影响力，或许后者的商业帝国赖以维系的债务幕后的债主是俄罗斯人。特朗普与俄罗斯“改善关系”的任何尝试，最先伤害的将是乌克兰和格鲁吉亚，这两个身处困境的国家一直依靠美国的支持才得以保持独立的民主国家地位。广州经济翻译公司。
More broadly, a Trump presidency will signal the end of an era in which America symbolised democracy itself to people living under corrupt authoritarian governments around the world. American influence has always depended more on its “soft power” rather than misguided projections of force such as the invasion of Iraq. America’s choice last Tuesday signifies a switching of sides from the liberal internationalist camp, to the populist nationalist one. It is no accident that Trump was strongly supported by Ukip’s Nigel Farage, and that one of the first people to congratulate him was the National Front’s Marine Le Pen.
更广泛地说，特朗普担任总统将标志着一个时代的终结，在那个时代，美国对世界各地生活在腐败威权政府统治之下的人们而言就是民主的象征。美国的影响力一直更多地依赖于其“软实力”，而非像入侵伊拉克那样的不明智的武力使用。美国11月8日作出的选择意味着，它脱离自由国际主义阵营，改投了民粹民族主义阵营。特朗普受到英国独立党(UKIP)领袖奈杰尔•法拉奇(Nigel Farage)如此强烈的支持并非偶然，国民阵线的马琳•勒庞是最早对特朗普获胜表示祝贺的人之一也非偶然。
Over the past year, a new populist-nationalist internationale has appeared, by which like-minded groups share information and support across borders. Putin’s Russia is one of the most enthusiastic contributors to this cause, not because it cares about other people’s national identity, but simply to be disruptive. The information war that Russia has waged through its hacking of Democratic National Committee emails has already had a hugely corrosive effect on American institutions, and we can expect this to continue.
过去一年，一个新的“民粹-民族主义国际”已经浮现，想法相同的组织通过这个新的“国际”跨境共享信息和支持。普京领导的俄罗斯是这一事业最热心的支持者之一，不是因为它关心其他民族的民族认同，而只是为了制造混乱。俄罗斯通过侵入民主党全国委员会(Democratic National Committee)邮件系统发动的信息战，已然对美国的制度造成了巨大的侵蚀，我们可以预期这种状况还将持续。广州经济翻译公司。
There remain a number of large uncertainties with regard to this new America. While Trump is a consistent nationalist at heart, he is also very transactional. What will he do when he discovers that other countries will not renegotiate existing trade pacts or alliance arrangements on his terms? Will he settle for the best deal he can get, or simply walk away? There has been a lot of talk about the dangers of his finger on the nuclear trigger, but my sense is that he is much more isolationist at heart than someone eager to use military force around the world. When he confronts the reality of dealing with the Syrian civil war, he may well end up taking a page from the Obama playbook and simply continue to sit this one out.
关于这个新美国，目前仍存在若干较大的不确定因素。虽然特朗普本质上是一个一贯的民族主义者，但他也非常善做交易。当特朗普发现其他国家不会按照他的条件，就现有贸易协定或同盟安排重新进行谈判时，他会怎么做？他会退而接受自己能得到的最好交易，还是会一走了之？对于由他来控制核按钮的危险性，人们已经谈论了很多，但我的感觉是，他内心深处更是一个孤立主义者，而非一个渴望在全世界使用武力的人。在他面对处理叙利亚内战这个现实时，他最后很可能会借鉴奥巴马的剧本，继续袖手旁观。
This is the point at which the matter of character will come into play. Like many other Americans, I find it hard to conceive of a personality less suited to be the leader of the free world. This stems only in part from his substantive policy positions, as much from his extreme vanity and sensitivity to perceived slights. Last week, when on a stage with Medal of Honor winners, he blurted out that he too was brave, “financially brave”. He has asserted that he wants payback against all his enemies and critics. When faced with other world leaders who will slight him, will he react like a challenged Mafia boss, or like a transactional businessman?
在这一点上，性格特征将会发挥作用。像许多美国人一样，我觉得很难想象有性格比特朗普更不适合担当自由世界领袖的人了。他实质性的政策立场只是部分原因，其他原因还包括他极端的虚荣心以及敏感的自尊心。不久前，在与荣誉勋章(Medal of Honor)获得者同台时，他脱口而出，称自己也很勇敢——“在财务上很大胆”。他声称要对自己所有的敌人和批评者进行报复。当面对轻视他的其他世界领导人时，他的反应是会像一个受到挑战的黑手党老大，还是会像一个善做交易的商人？广州经济翻译公司。
Today, the greatest challenge to liberal democracy comes not so much from overtly authoritarian powers such as China, as from within. In the US, Britain, Europe, and a host of other countries, the democratic part of the political system is rising up against the liberal part, and threatening to use its apparent legitimacy to rip apart the rules that have heretofore constrained behaviour, anchoring an open and tolerant world. The liberal elites that have created the system need to listen to the angry voices outside the gates and think about social equality and identity as top-drawer issues they must address. One way or the other, we are going to be in for a rough ride over the next few years.
如今，对自由民主的最大挑战，与其说来自中国等公开实行威权主义的国家，不如说来自于自由民主世界内部。在美国、英国、欧洲以及其他许多国家，政治体制中民主的部分正在反抗自由的部分，并有可能利用其表面上的合法性来撕毁现行的一些规则，正是那些规则一直以来约束了行为，支撑起一个开放、包容的世界。创造了这一体系的自由主义精英们需要倾听门外愤怒的声音，把社会平等和身份认同作为他们必须解决的最重要问题来思考。不管怎样，我们在未来几年都免不了经历一段艰难旅程。
The writer is a senior fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute and author of ‘Political Order and Political Decay’
本文作者是斯坦福大学(Stanford)弗里曼•斯波利研究所(Freeman Spogli Institute)高级研究员，其最新著作是《政治秩序和政治衰败》(Political Order and Political Decay)
