广州财务翻译公司：中国监管机构统一步调应对债务问题

Chinese regulators show more joined-up approach to debt

中国监管机构统一步调应对债务问题

广州财务翻译公司：随着债务问题日益严峻，中国监管机构一改去年救市时的不协调，转而齐心协力处置坏账、审慎控制风险。什么原因造成了这些改变？

WhenChina’s stock market plunged more than 30 per cent over the summer last year, the country’s regulators leapt into action. Unfortunately, the leaping in question was less a graceful, synchronised jump and more a Three Stooges physical slapstick comedy routine as the government scrambled to retain control of its equity markets. Regulator actions were uncoordinated, at times even contradictory.

去年夏季中国股市暴跌逾30%时，中国的监管者跳起来就采取行动。遗憾的是，当中国政府急于要控制住股市时，这一跳并不是多么优美，步伐也不整齐，而更像是《三个臭皮匠》(Three Stooges)里的一幕肢体喜剧表演。监管层行动非但不协调，有时还互相矛盾。广州财务翻译公司。

The disharmony was the result of two factors: the lack of any will for significant interdepartmental communication and a desire to avoid any responsibility for a failurefailing to save the markets.

这种不和谐是由两个因素造成的：部门之间缺乏进行切实有效沟通的意愿；各方都希望在救市不成功的情况下避免承担责任。广州财务翻译公司。

Chinese regulators have distinct agendas that can be at odds with one another. By increasing insurance and bank exposure to the then-collapsing markets, the bank and insurance regulators were at risk of dragging their own sectors into a mess they could not control.

中国监管机构彼此之间的议程可能并不一致。将更多的银行和保险资金投入当时正在崩溃的股市，银行和保险监管机构就要担风险，结果可能使得它们所监管的行业陷入自己无法收拾的乱局。广州财务翻译公司。

Political advancement inChinatends to be a zero-sum game, which can in turn mean an emphasis on competition over co-operation. Regulatory ministers compete for senior positions, angling for leadership control over leading economic groups. Behind the scenes, it was assumed that getting in too deep with the rescue efforts would make your own department responsible should the efforts fail, a career-ending move that no official was willing to make unless coerced.

中国政坛上的晋升往往是一场零和游戏，这反过来促使官员们看重竞争甚于合作。监管机构的部级官员们争夺高层职务，谋求获得对主要经济集团的领导控制权。在私底下，有一种看法是，假如过多参与救市行动，那么一旦救市失败，你领导的部门就要负责任。这是一种葬送前程的做法，除非上头命令，没有官员会主动这么做。广州财务翻译公司。

This year, asChina’s debt questions loomever-larger on the horizon,China’s regulators are striking a different tune: they are working in concert to identify the problem, dispose of the current bad debt and contain prudential risk. No more Three Stooges.

今年，随着中国债务问题变得愈发严峻，中国监管机构终于改弦易辙：各部门齐心协力找出问题所在、处置当前坏账并控制审慎风险。不再是“三个臭皮匠”了。广州财务翻译公司。

China’s debt is similar to a large heap of dry leaves piled up dangerously close to an open flame. Traditional non-performing loans are on the rise, while opaque, retail-exposed structured product defaults threaten systemic stability.

当前中国债务所带来的挑战就犹如在一团明火旁边堆积起一大堆干树叶，非常危险。传统的不良贷款持续增加，同时不透明、面向散户的结构性产品违约危及金融系统的稳定。广州财务翻译公司。

The worst-case scenario would be that enough structured products default to drag down liquidity, causing banks to call in bad debt. This in turn would cause a domino effect acrossChina’s NPLs, interconnected wealth management products and short-term financing vehicles.

最糟糕的局面将是结构性产品违约达到一定数量，从而导致流动性干涸，银行坏账增加。这进而将在不良贷款、互相关联的理财产品以及短期融资工具等领域引发多米诺骨牌效应。广州财务翻译公司。

This time, however, regulators are pre-empting the problem and moving in harmony to address the issue. A slew of mMore than 25 policies released over the course ofin the past several few months are meant to address the abovese two concerns, clearing out the dry leaves and stamping down on the open flames. On the dry leaves front, rTo address the debt,Regulators have been clearing out the pile by implementing national debt-equity swap programmes, establishing additional regulations meant to facilitate corporate debt restructuring, enhancing transparency in bank NPLs and banning high debt local governments from selling new debt.

不过这一次中国监管机构采取了前瞻性做法，正在协同行动解决问题。数月来官方发布了至少25项政策以解决上述两个方面的问题：清除干树叶和踩灭明火。在清除干树叶方面，监管机构推行了全国性的债转股计划，颁布新规以推动企业债务重组，增强银行不良贷款透明度，并禁止债务负担沉重的地方政府发新债。广州财务翻译公司。

These are aAll these policies that have been enacted by the People’s Bank of China, the China Banking Regulatory Commission and the ministry of finance. The CBRC and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission are also working together to cut down on short-term financing vehicles. On the open flames front, rRegulators have been working together to They are also clamping down on systemic risk across sectors. The CBRC has released a draft of tighter risk management tools for securities firms, tightened underwriting measures for private bond issuance and strengthened measures to curb speculation across asset classes.

所有这些政策都是央行(PBoC)、银监会(CBRC)和财政部联合实施的。银监会和保监会(CIRC)还联合对短期融资工具加以限制。在扑灭明火方面，监管机构采取联合措施消除各个行业中的系统性风险。银监会发布了一份要求券商采取更严格风险管理工具的计划草案，对私募债券发行实施更严格的承销办法，并加强了遏制各资产领域投机活动的措施。

The CBRC has suspended a swath of commercial bank wealth management products, along with requiring banks to review credit risks inChina’s notorious overcapacity sectors. The CIRC has banned insurers from conducting business with risky non-bank online financing platforms. Itthe regulator has also required insurers to suspend the not-so-legitimate business practice of helping banks move debt off balance sheet.

银监会暂停了一大批商业银行理财产品，同时要求银行评估产能严重过剩行业的信用风险。保监会则禁止保险公司与高风险的非银行线上融资平台开展业务，并叫停保险公司开展帮助银行将债务转移到表外这种不太合规的操作。

Regulatory co-ordination on this level does not occur without a tight leash from Beijing, which points to a central government conductor managing the strategy. This theory is bolstered by the recent “authoritative person” interview an article in theofficial newspaper of the Communist party’s official People’s Daily that sketched out red flags inChina’s the economy. One of the main points made in the interview wasIt identified talked of the necessity of clamping need to clamp down on debt while identifying significant leverage in the economy, the two objectives already being carried out by the regulators. The central government conductor in question, potentially the same person to be interviewed as the anonymous “authoritative person”, is most likely a close adviser to Xi Jinping and potentially the same person interviewed in the article.

如果没有来自中央的严格管束，是不会出现这种水平的监管协调的。这可能意味着有一个中央政府指导员在掌管战略。《人民日报》(People’s Daily)最近一篇概谈中国经济中危险信号的“权威人士”访谈为这种推理提供了支持。这篇文章中的一个主要观点是在识别经济中大量杠杆的同时有必要控制债务。目前监管机构在这两个目标上都已经在采取措施。上面说到的中央指导员与这篇访谈中匿名的“权威人士”有可能是同一个人，而且很可能是习近平的某一个心腹顾问。

Our bet is on Liu He, one of Mr Xi’s top economic advisers. Mr Liu is a long-time technocrat within in the Chinese political machine, having advocated for market-based policies since the 1990s. Look for his continued rise within the Chinese ranks: the greater the responsibilities he assumes, the more likely market reforms will overcomeChina’s entrenched interests favouring the current, unsustainable status quo.

我们推测此人是习近平最高经济顾问之一刘鹤。刘是中国政治体系中的一名资深技术官员，自上世纪90年代以来就倡导市场化的政策。期待他步步高升：他承担的责任越大，市场化改革就越有可能战胜根深蒂固的利益集团，这些集团乐于保持不可持续的现状。

Gilliam Collinsworth Hamilton is the head of the Beijing office for NSBO, a Beijing-basedChinapolicy research house. The views in this article are his own and do not necessarily reflect NSBO house views.

本文作者是蓝橡资本英国(NSBO)北京办事处负责人，该办事处是一个中国政策研究机构。本文仅代表他个人，不代表NSBO观点。

广州财务翻译公司